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Introduction 
1. Birth and growth, youth and maturity, senescence and death, frame--
if somewhat differently for males and females-- the life span of an 
individual as a member of society. Demographic processes and structures, 
while resting on a biological base,_ have far-reaching social irnpli-. 
cations. Fertility, growth, mortality, and the resulting sex and 
age distributions of changing numbers, condit_ion the division of labor 
in society and the sequential roles-- economic and social-- of the 
demographically distinct groups. Conversely, economic and social 
processes and structures have far-reaching demographic consequences-­
affecting fertility, family formation, and the life cycle of depen­
dence, education, rnaturitypoccupation, and retirement. 
2. The economic growth process of a given historical epoch, 
characterized usually by distinctive major sources of inc1'eased 
capacity, must have specific effects on the demographic processes 
c:.nd structu:r•es. The~ effects a:,:,e associated with the opportunit iec, 
econo:nic and social, p:r.cvid<:!d by the epoch's sources of growth and 
development, and with the requirements that the current material 
and social technology imposes. Modifications of the 
basic demographic processes introduced by economic growth and social 
development, then become the bases that condition the further stages 
in the economic and social gPowth process . 
.•. 
~Prepared for Cnited Kations Symposiwn on Population and Development, 
held in Cairo in June 1973. 
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3. The discussion below concentrates, for greater relevance, 
on the interrelations between modern economic growth as exemplified 
by the process in the currently developed countries over the last 
one and a half to two centuries, and the major trends in their demo­
graphic processes. · But a similar interplay between population and 
economic growth (including concomitant social development) could 
be traced for pre-modern stretches of history in the presently 
developed countries, or for those regions of the world in the recent 
past that have been relatively free of the impact of modern economic 
growth. 
Interrelations between Fonulation Trends and Modern Economic Growth 
4. The major demographic trends observed in the developed 
countries ( largely Europe, .the European offshoots overseas, and 
Japan) over the long period since they entered modern economic growth 
are familiar and do not call for lengthy discussion. 
1 
Of prime 
importaiice was the marked reduction in mortality, which raised life 
expectancy at birth fr•om forty years or below to close to seventy 
years. It had major Impacts on the mortality of infants and young 
children, on the mortality (and associated morbidity) from infections 
and related diseases, and on mortality in the cities, which had 
previously suffered from much higher death rates than the country­
side. This reduction in mortality was accompanied, but not simul­
taneously, by a decline in fertility. The crude birth rates declined 
( in the older countries of Europe) from over· 30 pep 1,000 to well 
below 20) a trend that larp;ely reflected intra-mc:irital fel'tility and 
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was a res;;lt of decisions by the families to limit the number of 
children. It was not the result of any genetic changes, or of in­
voluntary reaction by the human species to changes in the material 
conditions associated with economic growth. The combination of 
low mor,tality 'n'ith low fertility-- while . still allowing for a much 
greater long-term rate of natural increase than that over the pre­
ceding centuries of higher birth and death rates-- was new and unique. 
It had to be new because the opportunities for reducing the death 
rates to the low levels attained were new and unparalleled in the past. 
5. The above comments may suggest both a close timing relation 
between modern economic gr·owth and the downward ·trends in mortality 
and fertility; and a distinction between the long-term trends in 
mortality and fertility, in that the element of human choice and 
decision \•!as absent in the former and of great importance in the 
latter. Neither suggestion is valid. In many European com1tries 
crude death rates declined .in the eighteenth century and wer·e i.n 
the1r low 20' s by the second quarter of the nineteenth century--­
pr~e:eding the initiation of modern econom1c growth by sevc:ral decades. 
By con-'.:rast, in many countries there was no furthc::r decisive decl.1ne 
of death ratf'!s ·,mtil late in the nineteenth century~ with most of 
the reduction conc8ntrated in the CUX'l'8nt century-- severnl decades 
a.fter modern economic gr-o;;th was initiated. Urban death rates were 
substantially higher than rural even in the first decade of the! 
twentieth century, in the European countries and in the Unit~d StG.t~s. 
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Likewise, in the older European countries (but not in the United 
States), fertility did not begin to decline until well into the last 
quarter of the nineteenth centuryaa.- with a substantial lag after 
the initiation of their modern economic growth. Despite the con­
nection betwee~ the delay in the decline of birth rates and the delay 
in the decline of mortality (and the latter provides only a partial 
explanation), and despite the connection between the delay in the 
decline of ffiortality and the effects of rapid urbanization on the 
aggregate death rate,; it still remains true that the timing of the 
broad association between modern patterns of mortality and fertility 
and modern economic growth, is not close. The economic growth processes 
undoubtedly provided opportunities for reducing mortality and raised 
the ind_ucements and requirements for lower fertility. But the 
opportunities were not so free of obstacles,nor the inducernents and 
:r,equirements so dominant in the early stages of the industrialization 
process, as to effect a prompt response in the demographic trends. 
6. Nor was a strong element of social, or even individual, de­
cision absent from the prci):imate fa·ctors that made for the reduction 
of mortality, and -for the delay in its decline in · the· nfoeteenth­
centUl''Y. Granted that for an individual, .the decision to postpone 
d~ath is not usually a .m~tter of choice~ the views on mo~tality....:­
.particularly of .chiJ:d:hm-:_ changed -slowly". The acceptance ·of their -
death as 11 usual" - or even ·as an offset tq the ''im]_X'o·vidence of the 
· p.ooi'II persisted. But -- it_ was the _s-0ciaJly a:eter~foed implemented . 
decision that- f:as Tr.Ol'C i..elling. If -the reduction in- dea,:1:Ji-rates · 
~ - - -
before -wc-11'ld h'o.r II was due, as has recently been argued, to bettei... 
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nutrition and living conditions, and to public health and sanitation 
- 2 
measures, far more than to advances in medical care and knowledge, . 
the role of social decisions becomes patent. The provision of means 
of subsistence and of housing, of generally improved living conditions, 
reflects policies on income distribution, prices of necessities, 
housing and treatment of the poor. Public health measures, involv-
ing political decisions on uses of funds and on regulation of the 
private sector and of individuals, clearly rested on a social consensus 
that was s1ow in coming. . A delay in the latter would have delayed 
even further the decline in the urban, and hence aggregate, death 
rates. The long struggles of the public health reformers through 
much of the nineteenth. century clearly indicate that even when the 
sources of h1gh mortality wer·e known, much effort had to be expendE.d 
to secure the soc~al decisions needed to reduce their impact. 
7. The opportunities and pressures produced by modern economic 
growth led to decisions important in the reductions of the death 
and crucial in the declines of the birth r•ates, and affected family 
formation, location and migration, and the life cycle sequence of 
education, occ,~pation, and retirement. Fol"' a better unde1~standing 
of these we note some distinctive fcatll.!'es of modern economic 
growth. The reference rr•ust perforce be b:;:,ief and simple. But the 
features are sufficient1y consr.>icuous a.nd pers:i.stent, c:nd many of 
. . dth· em amp1y documented , to mi1um1ze' . m1sun er-st,::11d'ing. 
3 
8. First, the permissive basis for• tht! great rise in per 
capita product, combined with high rates of population growth, WctS 
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the rapid increase in our tested knowledge of natural processes, 
applied to problems of production technology. This increase took 
the form of successive technological innovations, which in their 
spread into mass use raised product and productivity. They also 
led to further knowledge concerning the properties of nature and 
to invention of additional tools, which facilitated new discoveries-­
and thus led to further applications. The re-enforcing connections 
between discoveries, inventions, innovations, applications, further 
learning, more discovery, and so on, permitted the sustained pressure 
toward higher production levels. But the key link in this chain 
was the mass application of innovations for wide use-- which meant 
that knowledge was directed toward agreed-upon useful ends, among 
which the provision of goods for ultimate consumption was paramount. 
It was hardly an accident that innovations relating to final con­
sumption and consumer goods were just as prominent as those relating 
to producer goods; and that the growth of consumption per capita 
was almost as great as that of total product per capita. This 
orientation of knowledge to useful ends and of production to ul­
timate consumption obviously has bearing on mortality-- life and 
health being prime consumption goods. It also has bearing on 
fertility, in that the orientation toward greater consumption for 
the existing and next generations would, other conditions being equal, 
lead to the choices of fewer children. These implications will become 
clearer as we consider some other distinctive features of modern 
economic growth, closely connected with the one just noted. 
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9. ~econd, a hiRh rate of growth of product per capita, fed 
by successive technological innovations and their mass application, 
was, perforce, accompanied by rapid changes in the production 
structure of the country undergoing modern economic growth-- the 
structure of the sectors in which the active economic members of the 
population were engaged-- with consequent ch<:'-nges in the occupations 
and the g~ographic location of these participants. These rapid 
changes in the country's production structure were partly due to 
shifts in domestic demand r•eflecting different income elasticities 
of demand for various goods; partly to the tendency of the focus 
of innovations to shift from one sector to another, as the pot en-
tials of economic advantage of new applications shifted ; and 
partly to the effects of innovations in transport, communication 
and the natural resource advantag~ among nations. Industrialization-­
the movement of output, capital, and labor shai'.'es from agriculture 
to indµstry·~-== has been the 1nost prominent of these cl1anges in pro-
duction structure; but the shifts within the non-agricultural sector, 
particularly of lc:.bo1., toward the service- rather than commodity-
producing in6.ust1•ie::;, have been equally importi:t.nt. One implication 
of these rapid shifts in production st1~ucture for om.. theme is that 
they widen the possibility of inter-generational bpeaks-- with sons 
be:i.ng attached to industries, occupations, and locations different 
from those of their fathers, to a far• greater extent than in a more 
slowly changing, traditionals economy. The effect on formation of 




the younger generation, is obvj.ous • Moreover, it is re-enforced by 
other aspects of this shift in production structure that have 
markedly influenced population trends. 
10. One of the two most relevant aspects is the sharp rise 
in the proportions cf capital and labor engaged in large-scale, non­
personal enterprises-- as contrasted with the decline in the propor­
tions attached to small-scale, personal, or family units. The other 
is the sharp rise in the educational and other skill requirements of 
labor. The rise in the size of the productive plant was associated 
with the economies of scale of modern technology. These economies 
were the results of technological properties of new sources of in­
dustrial power, of better controls over precision in fabrication 
and of major improvements in intra-plant communication-- technological 
and social. The growth of the large-scale enterprise (the economic, 
not the production, unit)was also facilitated by the revolutionary 
changes in communication, and by the organizational innovations 
feasible with a technology the rules of which could be overtly form­
ulated and easily and widely communicated-- impossible on the 
basis of earlier personal master-apprentice relations. The require­
ments for more for.nal education and greaterskills were partly a direct 
consequence of the larger scale of productive units and enterprises, 
which demanded adequate communication and understanding within the 
organization; partly a reflection of the increasing reliance of 
society on the production of new knowledge as a source of further 
growth; and partly a result of the need for formal education as the 
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basis for judging the equipment of would-be participants-- given 
the system of recruitment into economic activity associated with 
modern economic gro·r1th, to be touched upon below. 
11. The rapid shifts in production structure, the emergence 
of large-scale production plants and economic enterprises, and the 
rise in educational requirements of the economically active groups 
in the population had striking effects on the location of population, 
internal migration, family formation, and the typical life cycle of 
an individual or- family unit. Describing these population trends 
as consequences or corollaries of modern economic growth, or respon­
ses by individuals and families to changing opportunities and chang-
ing conditions of exploiting these opportu.~ities associated 
with economic growth, is partly a semantic problem. The important 
point is the coherence between the economic growth and the population 
trends, a basis for evaluating the current situation in both developed 
and developing countries. 
12. Indus::rializa~ion was associated with intensive mode1°n 
urbanization because the former was accompanied by a rise in the 
scale of the productive unit to a point where the econoi:iies of 
scale demanded concentration of production and large bodies of wol'kers, 
and induced the formation of new or la!'ger cities. Even without 
economies of scale, the movement away from agriculture would have 
furthered url~anization: the emergence of specialized crafts in the 
Middle Ages led to some urbanization in the European countries~ even 
though the scale of handicraft production and trade was relath·ely small. 
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But it was primarily the rapidly rising scale of modern technology 
and the successful resolution of the problems of communication and 
organization that powered the movement toward the cities and their 
rapid rate of growth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, pari 
passu with the accelerated rate of growth of product and population. 
An additional, and key, permissive factor lay in the marked rise in 
labor productivity in agriculture, which made it possible for a small 
fi~action of the labor force (well below 10 percent in recent years) to 
produce enough agricultural goods to satisy, at a high per capita 
level, the other nine-tenths of the population. The rapid movement, 
suggested by these fractions, to high levels of urbanization, is 
clearly a product of modern technology and economic growth -- much 
of it in response to economic scales of production and enterprise. 
And the recent emergence of dormitory suburbs in the developed in­
dustrialized countries, an attempt at adjustment permitted by greater 
affluence, only confirms the element of economic pressure, involved 
. h b . ' .1n t e ur anizatJ.on process in ear1·1er decades. 
4 
13. Given the parameters of modern economic growth, particularly 
those of the growth of sectoral demand for labor, and the more 
limited parameters of population growth, rapid urbanization and rapid 
structural changes within the production system could not have occurred 
without vast internal migration. With modern economic growth character­
ized by rapid structural changes, which imply wide differences in the 
growth rates of the various parts of the structure, the disparities 
between differential :rates of population increase and differential rates 
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of growl~ of demand for labor are bound to become wide. When the 
deriiand for labor in some new industries grows between 5 and 10 per­
cent per year, and that in the older industries located elsewhere 
hardly gr-ows at all, the differential in natural increase rates cannot 
accommodate itself to such disparities. In addition, there was, 
through most of the period, a higher rate o.f natural increase in the 
countryside -- where additional employment opportunities were limited-­
than in the cities, in which such opportunities grew more rapidly. 
Urbanization reflected only the major disparities between rates of 
natural increase and rates of gro~~h of employment opportunities, 
and the internal migration implicit in it was only part of the 
stream augmented by inter-city and inter-regional flows (in some 
countries, the United States for example, immigi"'ation contributed 
to the adjustment by its differential flm1 into those regions where 
demand for labor was particularly active). Such vast internal mi­
gration and immigration is important for our theme. It broke the 
ties between the par-ticipant in economic activity and his family 
origins; it made the migrant more recepthre to econom:i.c opportunities; 
it changed the conditions of life and work, with whatever' effects 
they rnay have had on far.1ily formation and fertility; and it re­
enforced the increasing sepa:::-iation between family and ec011omic ac­
tivity, which has been a most important consequence of modern economic 
growth. 
14. Migration only re-enforced the separation between the family 
and economic activity that was impo~;ed by the increas,~ in scale of 
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production and of the economic enterprise. Unlike a farm, a handi-
craft shop, a small store, or an individual service activity, a 
modern large-scale plant cannot be contained within a household. 
A large economic enterprise, demanding large amounts of fixed capital 
and with a perpetuating future not dependent on any one person's 
or family's life, cannot be effectively operated as a personal or 
a family firm. It demands an overt, impersonal, and effective 
organization in which the roles, responsibilities, and privileges 
are explicitly formulated and legally enforceable. The control and 
organization of large-scale production demand that it be separated 
from the household. The individual participants must perform their 
tasks within the plant or the office, away from their families and 
households. They thus become members of a group whose practices 
and discipline have only limited contact with the life of the in­
dividual participant as a member of a household or a family. As 
a result, a large vol~~e of economic activity formerly carried on 
within the households of traditonal farmers, craftsmen, shopkeepers, 
etc. has been removed from family activity. Moreover, the function 
of the family as an institution transmitting economic experience and 
skills from one generation to the next has been severely limited. 
And while the process began with the removal of market-oriented ac­
tivities from most families, it was followed by mechanization of house­
hold services, by professionalization and hence removal from the 
family of many educational services, and by the shift out of the 
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family and into the organized labor markets of an increasing propor­
tion of domestic labor resources that previously had provided services 
within the family. 
15. The removal of the full-time economic activity from the family 
and household and the resulting separ-ation between the production 
plant and the home were accompanied) and eventually re-enforced, 
by the revolutionary changes in the practice and criteria of recruitment 
of individuals into econom-ic activity. Given the large scale of the 
modern plant and enterprise, the large numbers of active partici-
pants involved, and the migrant origin of much of the available 
labor, it was impossible to recruit on the basis of personal knowledge 
of candidates and their family 01'igins (although this approach was 
followed in the recruitrnent of unskilled immigrants th1,ough the 
ethnic compatriot boss system in some early phases of U.S. growth). 
Furthermore, the requirements of rising education and other skills 
to handle effecti·vely rather complex production tasks involving cost-
ly capital equipment) made personal knowledge of an applicant far less 
important than knowledge of h:i.s testable equipment, whether it wa.s 
l-
manual dexterity, ability to relate to people, o:r general or pro­ 1 
fessional formal education. The large numbers and t'he large eco­
nomic magnitudes involved in ac.eguate resolution of recruiting a.nd 
staffing problems warranted a concertP.d and prolonged effort to de­
velop an effective classification of the production tasks within the 
plant and enterprise, and to formulate criteria of satisfactory se­
lection. Tl1ese were bound to repJ.ace tl1e traditional type of 
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recruitment based on personal knowledge of workers and of their 
family antecedents. The shift from recruitment on the basis of 
status, closely connected with family origins and warranted in 
earlier times by lack of better ways for judging the suitability of 
individuals fnr their economic tasks, to recruitment on the basis of a 
person's objectively tested capacity for performance, specifically 
formulated to a well defined range of production tasks, was a revol~­
tionary change in the modernization of society in adjustment to 
modern economic growth. And it had far-reaching effects on popu­
lation and the life cycle of its members. Economic activity and pre­
paration for it occupy much of the life of an individual, from child­
hood through maturity; and major changes in conditions of entry, and 
implicitly in the criteria for rise within the economic system, that 
occurred in the shift in recruitment, were bound to have multiple and 
far-reaching consequences. 
16. One immediate consequence was the rise in the level of 
formal education and the spread of formal certification. The edu­
cational system became increasingly involved in screening individuals, 
and in channeling them to more advanced levels roughly on the basis 
of ability-- even if qualified by parental position and by surviving 
patterns of discrimination. A growing proportion of the labor force 
underwent longer periods of general and professional training, which 
was supplemented at later stages of the occupational career. /',nd 
a rapidly increasing share of economic positions was contingent upon 
fonmal certification, with respect either to educational levels attained 
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or to specialized skills , or to both. Thus, the trend within 
labor force away from entrepreneurial and self-employment to em­
ployment status was accompanied by the trends to higher levels of 
formal and specialized education, professionalization of occupations, 
and an extension of certification. For our theme, the main bearing 
of these trends is the increased investment in human (as distinct 
from material) capital, prolongation of the period of education that 
kept the younger generation out of both economic and household ac­
tivity, in separate schools; and thus contributed further to the 
shift of the transmission of knowledge and experience between 
generations from the family and household to the non-family, non­
personal institutions. 
17. The distinctive characteristics of modern economic growth 
noted above -- rapid cha~ges in production structm,e, urbanization 
and vast internal migration (and immigration), the shifts of re-
quirements and conditions of participation in economic activity and 
the associated increase of emphasis c,n education and training, 
and testable criteria of individual performance-- all had profound 
influences on fertility, family formation, and the life cycle of 
learning, work,and retirement. These influences were not limited 
to the urban populations whose proportions in the total were rapidly 
growing. They extended also to the rural populations that were 
sending many of their younger gene:ration to the cities and the con­
ditions of whose life were also thoroughly affected by the higher 
educational and other requirements of r:1odern economic F,rowth. ln 
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fact, the declines in rural fertility in a country like the United 
States were, at least before World War II, relatively as great as 
those for urban fertility -- although the differentials tended to 
persist. 
18. The decline in birth rates was clearly associated with 
the greatly increased costs of children, resulting partly from the 
withdrawal of their labor from the family milieu, and partly from 
the requirement for a longer and more expensive span of education 
and training. Both of these costs were directly connected with the 
rearing of the next generation to economic maturity and with the 
upward mobility of the parental generation itself. These trends 
toward greater costliness of children were re-enforced by the shift 
to urban life, and the competitive pressures of a rising standard 
of consumption, in the cities and in the countryside. The resulting 
decline in the size of the family was re-enforced by the separa-
tion of generations. Cor·respondingly, a 
' 
trend developed toward the 
conjugal (or nuclear) family, characterized by"the relative exclusion 
of a wide range of affinal and blood relatives from its everyday 
affairs, 11 and·effectivly limited to parents and their children largely 
below the adult ages, and free from more extended family ties in the 
choice of mates.in the process of family formation and in the choice 
of location. 5 And, too, the life cycle of learning, work , and re­
tirement changed markedly. The age of entry into the labor force in 
the developed countries rose substc=mtially, associated largely with 
the prolongation of the period of formal education; and the age of 
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retirement from full-time economic activity dropped sharply, reflected 
the more widespread employee status combined with the increased ob­
solescence of human skills and facilitated by institutional provisions 
for supporting the retired population. Since all these demographic 
trends can be viewed as responses, in a greater or less degree, to 
the requirements for effective and productive economic activity 
under the shifting conditions of modern economic growth, when realized, 
they contributed significantly to the high growth rates of the 
developed countries. It is difficult to envisage modern economic 
growth without the reduced birth rates, the greater investment in 
human capital represented by education and training, the smaller 
family, and the concentration of the labor force in the prime ages 
between the late entry and early retirement. 
19. The condensed summary of the interrelations between popula-
tion trends and modern economic growth must be concluded with a 
brief reference to four major qualifications. They are reminders 
of omissions to be kept in mind in evaluating the bearing of the past 
interrelations on the present and future. 
20. First, the coherence betwE>en the opportunities and pequire­
ments of modern economic growth and the response of the population 
trends should not be viewed as an easy and smooth pPocess, character­
ized by close timing and a relatively close relation hetween the 
economic and demographic para'Tleters. The movement away from agri­
culture should not be viewed only as a response of labor to gr·eater 
opportunities in industry and the cities; it could just as well have 
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been the result of the push from the countryside produced by a 
shrinking market for agricultural products combined with advanced 
agricultural technology and institutions that displaced farm labor. 
The rapid changes in production structure stressed above meant not 
only greater opportunities in the rapidly growing sectors but also 
declining opportunities and technological unemployment in the slowly 
growing sectors; and the adjustment was never a simple and prompt 
transfer of displaced resources. And, as already indicated, the 
decline of both death and birth rates lagged for decades behind 
industrialization in many currently developed countries. In other 
words, much of modern economic growth took place before the modern 
demographic patter'Ils emerged; also,before the wide spread of literacy 
and education. The process was long, with leads and lags, and 
disparities in adjustment; and like all processes of change in 
economic and social performance and institutions, it was subject to 
distortions and changes in pace. Thus, the demographic patter·ns that 
developed were not closely tied in with economic growth. While, 
in general, birth and death rates are lower in the developed than in 
the developing countries, within the group of developed countries 
general indexes like per capita product, and birth and death rates, 
are not closely associated. 
21, Second, the duration of the processes the interrelations 
of which are our theme, is partly due to the gradual spread, parti­
cularly of population trends, amonR the different social and economic 
groups within a developed country. The economic and social differentiaJs 
among birth and death rates could not be considered in our hrief 
sumrna:t'Y; but it is clear that the transition to lower birth and 
-19-
death rates, in response to greater opportunities provided by economic 
growth, could not occur simultaneously and at the same rate for all 
6
economic and social eroups. Some of the trends in the differential 
aspects of death and birth rates have significant bearing on changing 
inequalities ir. economic position and material welfare. At least 
the older cow1tries (as distinct from the European offshoots overseas) 
may have experienced for a while a widening of the economic and 
social differentials in fertility, with possible widening of in­
equality in size distl,,ibution of i.ncome. But this topic requires 
more intensive study than is feasible here; and is mentioned only 
because of its possible bearing on the prospects in d~veloping 
countries, once their transition to lower fertility levels begins. 
22. Third, modern economic growth spread gradually and began 
at different dates in the currently.developed countries-- these 
dates (rough approximations only) ranging n"om the late eighteenth 
century in the pioneering England, to the 1840 1 s for several European 
countries and the United States, to the 1880 1 s in Japan, and to the 
1930's for the USSR (after-an initial spurt in Russia in the 1890 1s). 
The international aspects of modern economic g1'owth could not be 
cover•ed in this su.111mary. Yet, needless -to say, they affected popu­
lation trends -- not'only through international migration, which 
was particularly open and responsive~ for the European countries of 
origin, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but 
also through the international demonstration effect of the declines 
in death and birth rates. The innovations in economic and social 
policies, and later in hcaJ.th tec.hnoJ.oe,y, made in the pionee:r. 
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countries, could spread to others, at lesser cost and input than 
required by the pioneers -- just as the economic advance of the pioneer 
developed countries could be followed, at lesser cost, by other 
countries that were sufficiently prepared to take advantage of the 
opportunities. The reduction in birth rates and the shift to the 
conjugal family, once emerged in the pioneer developed country, 
could become readily known and even adopted as a desirable model by 
a growing segment of the population in the follower countries. 
23. Fourth and last,the interrelations between economic growth 
and population trends are, as already indicated, only part of the 
network of factors determining demographic patterns; and, more 
relevant here, the connections between economic growth and population 
trends are not only direct but operate through what, from one stand­
point, may be viewed as intermediate variables. Yet each of the latter 
may have a life and effect of its own, both on population and on 
economic growth. To illustrate: modern economic growth has been 
associated with the increasing importance of the national sovereign 
state, which serves as the arbiter of conflicts generated by rapid 
economic growth, as the referee of the social and legal innovations 
stimulated by the latter, and as the regulator of any difficulities 
stemming from the conflict between private and social interests in 
a complex market economy. The existence of this effective poli.tical 
and social institution meant that policies relating to both mortality 
and fertility could be adopted that would not have been possible 
otherwise. Another illustration: the greater urbanization, the 
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formation of large cities, created a condition of anonymity among 
the inhabitants that was unknown in the rural and small town 
surroundings. This condition -- a direct result of urbanization, 
not of economic processes -- affected the consumption and living 
patterns and family formation pattern5. Or consider the effects 
of the power of science and tested knowledge on the diminution of 
on the teaching of Peligiousauthoritarian religious belief, and hence 
institutions and doctrine regarding life and death. In this case, 
modern economic growth affects ideology indirectly through the demon­
stration of the power bestowed on man by tested knowledge that accepts 
no authority except that of observation, experiment, and the canons 
of scientific inference. In short, both economic growth and modern 
population trends are parts of the whole modernization process that oc­
curred in the developed countries over the last one and a half to 
two centuries; and the two have inter-acted not only directly, but 
also via other institutional and ideological variables. 
Bearing on Current Problems 
24. The bearing of the preceding discussion on current problems 
can be put in general terms. Modern economic growth has provided 
opportunities for a great reduction in death rates and inducements 
and requirements for a marked reduction in birth rates; f01, a small, 
mobile family unit; and for a great change in the life cycle of 
education, occupation, and retirement. But with successive innovations 
and the rapid structural changes ,.mce;:•lying the high aggregate rate 
-22-
of modern growth, the response to opportunities and the adjustment 
to displacement and changing requirements was neither prompt nor 
smooth, if only because of technological unemployment, and a push 
toward migration even before the pull became dominant. Differentials 
in birth rates, death rates, and migration may have increased in­
equality .in the distribution of income before institutional adjust­
ments produced a shift toward equality; and, as exemplified by ecolog­
ical and other correlates, all the demographic consequences of 
modern economic growth could not be easily forecast or forestalled 
if found undesirable, Current social problems,.that ispcurrent 
developments that seem socially undesirable and call for remedial 
policy action, are largely the results of past growth, in which unfore-
seen consequences of past desirable attainments have grown to 
dimensions sufficient to demand attention. Recognition of a current 
social problem is thus a judgment, in terms of accepted criteria 
(which may change over time), of undesirable consequences of some 
past positive achievement. Of course, a current problem that 
originated in past positive achievement is still a problem calling 
for action, but relating it to its origin places it in the proper 
perspective and within a fairly wide group of similar problems that 
may have been overcome. And the ways in which the latter have been 
resolved deserve scrutiny, imitation, or rejection. 
25. Consider as an illustration -- all that is feasible here-­
a conspicuous current problem, the high rate of population growth in 
the less developed countries. That rate puts an increasinf, burden 
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on economic capacity and makes it increasingly difficult to raise 
the level of per capita product, to better the internal distribution 
of income, and to accumulate sufficient reserves to escape any 
adverse effects of unavoidable fluctuations (in weather and c1•ops) 
and of other uncertainties. According to recent estimates, in the 
less developed regions (Asia excluding Japan, Africa, Latin America 
excluding the Temperate subgroup,Oceania excluding Australia and 
New Zealand), which in 1750 accounted for• two-thir·ds of world 
population, crude birth rates between 1750 to 1920 averaged slightly 
over 40 per 1,000; crude death rates averaged slightly over 36 per 
7 
1,000; &nd the rate of natural increase was barely 4 per 1,000. 
This rate of natural increase was well below that for the developed 
regions, which rose from 4 per 1,000 in 1750-1800 to 9 in 1850-1900, 
and to 13 in 19CC-1910. Then, for the three decades, 1920-1950, 
the death rates in the less developed regions declined to al,out 30 
per 1,000, while birth rates remained somewhat above 40, which meant 
that the rate of natural increase almost tripled to 11 per 1,000, 
about the same level as for the developed ~egions in decades free 
of world wars Ol' "great n depressions. But the striking change ca..-ne 
after World Wai, II. The <lea.th rate in the less developed regions, 
which stood at 28 per 1,000 in 1940-1950, dropped to 22 in 1950-60, 
to 19 in 1960-65, and to 15 in 1965-70, wl1ile the crude birth rate 
moved from 40 per 1,000 in 1940-50 to 1}3 in 1950-60, to 42 in 1960-65 
and to 40-1/2 in 1965-70. Th~ crude rate of natm~al increase, con­
sequently rose f-roy;1 12 in 1940-50 to 214 in l9E,0-65, and to 21+-1/2 
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in 1965-70. Such a rate of increase, about 2.5 percent per year, 
was observed in the past only in the few exceptional developed countries 
(such as the Un:~ted States before late nineteenth century) that 
attracted large immigration and could take advantage of an abundance 
of natural resources; and it was over twice as high as the long-
term rates of pcpulation growth in the older developed countries 
of Europe and in Japan. 
26. The present medium projections assume that these crude 
rates of natural increase in the less developed regions will rise 
from 24-1/2 per 1,000 in 1965-70 to 25 in 1970-80. While this rise 
seems slight, even the continuation of the high growth rate for another 
decade poses a ch0.llenging problem. The implications of the pro­
jection ·are even graver when we distinguish between the East Asia 
region (dominated by Mainland China), which accounted in 1960 for 
645 million out of a total of 692), and the others (with a population 
of 1,315 million in 1960). This distinction is important because 
of the major diffe1°ences in social and political structure between 
Mainland China and other less developed regions and because of the 
scarcity of basic data and the tenuousness of both current estimates 
and projections for the former. If we combine the remaining less 
developed regions (excluding the negligible group in Oceania), the 
crude birth rate moves from 46 per 1,000 in 1950-60 to 45 in 1960-65, 
to 44 in 1965-70, and is projected to 42 1/2 in 1970-80 -- while 
the death rate drops over the four periods fr•orr, 24 to 20 to 17, and 
is projected to 13-1/2. The rate of natural increase rises from 22-1/2 
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to 25~1/2 to 27-1/2, and is then projected to the record level of 
29 per 1,000 in 1970-80. That such a growth rate of population 
in the less developed regions, which account for about four-tenths of 
the world population, constitutes a major problem -- if improvement 
in material welfare is to be attained -- can hardly be gainsaid. 
For both the high birth rates and the low death rates there is ample 
parallel in the past. But there is no historical parallel for this 
combination of high birth rates with low death rates, especially for 
at the lower levels of current economic performancecountries that are 
per head; nor is there parallel, in the history of modern economic 
growth, to such rapid declines in death rates (except _in the few 
years of recovery after epidemics). 
27. In the light of the preceding discussion, it is obvious 
that the problem is associated with the rapid decline in the death 
rates -- a positive attainment, made possible in large part by modern 
economic growth. The high level of technological capacity in 
in the medical arts, the ability to establishproduction as well as 
rapid communication with, and penetration into, the economically 
less developed world, and the basic philosophy of the value of 
material welfare and of health, all contributed to this achivement. 
Although obvious, this comment needs to be made in order to stress 
that the problem originated in the effective spread of a major 
positive contribution. To be sure, the difficulties could have 
been avoided by an equally prompt response of birth rates. But the 
slowness of the adjustment should not blind us to the magnitude 
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of the positive attainment, realized and projected. And it can be 
argued that such a decline in death is an indispensable pre­
requisite for modern economic p,rowth; and that it is also a pre­
requisite for the decline in birth rates, in so far as they are 
determined by a given surviving size of family desired by the 
parental ieneration. 
28. The second comment stems from our discussion of the connec-
tion between modern economic growth and the decline in birth rates 
in the developed countries. We stressed the changed inducements 
and requirements of the modern economy that made fewer children, with 
greater investment in their education and training, and a smaller 
family, more attractive;and suggested that, in general, economic 
growth and modernization removed the need for a large family by 
shifting many of its economic, educational, and protective functions 
to impersonal business or public enterprise, educational insti-
tutions, and the state. These institutional-change-corollaries of 
modern economic growth, components in the general modernization 
process, took: time to evolve, and the decline in birth rates was 
both delayed and drawn out-- particularly in the countries that 
entered modern economic growth first. The relevant question here for 
the less developed regions of today is whether the economic, political, 
and social institutions have been restructured, and the ideological 
views of society changed, to place emphasis on greater investment in 
fewer children, to pr·ovide political and social stability combined 
with internal social mobility that would enhance the interest of the 
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parental generation in smaller families. 
29. An answer to this question demands more knowledge of the 
changing social and political institutions of the less developed 
regions than is at hand. The temptation to give a negative answer 
is great, but is not fully valid. Modernization has been initiated 
and substantial reduction in birth rates. has been realized in several 
less developed cow1tries. Yet, to point up the difficulties in 
establishing political stability, we need only mention the internal 
conflicts in such major countries of Asia as Pakistan, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines, and of subSaharan Africa as the Congo, Nigeria, 
and Ghana, and the spread of military dictatorships i~ much of Latin 
American and other less developed regions. The absence of political 
stability makes it impossible to generate a restructuring of economic 
and social institutions, which are often likely to sharpen the con­
flict betw~en traditional and modern interests. The comment is made, 
despite limitations in our- knowledge, in order to emphasize the 
connection between declines in birth rates and the necessary trans­
formation of economic and social institutions that would assure 
the interest of the parental generation in fewer children and in 
greater investment in human capital. A social and economic structure 
that provides no rewards for fewer. children, with slight prospect of 
a better future for· them and their parents, would scarcely encourage 
low birth rates. This is not to minimize the effects of recent 
improvements in the technology of birth control in response to the 
recognition of a rno1'e acute need fop them, nor of relevant chanp;es 
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in public attitudes and governmental policies -- all of which may 
be needed to implement fully the interest in smaller families once 
it is established. However, far-reaching reductions in birth 
rates require an economic and social milieu that would not reward 
reliance on a genetic lottery, i.e. on a large number of surviving 
children, for lack of assurance that greater inv~strnent in fewer 
numbers would yield appreciable benefits-- to the parental and to 
the younger generation. 
30. Third, once birth rates begin to drop in the developing 
countries, the reduction is likely to be evident first among some 
groups, usually those in the modern advanced types of professional 
and modern occupations and those in the upper.income brackets; and 
will only later spread to the more traditional, and lower income, 
occupations. It may, therefore, for a_ time, have the effect of 
maintaining, or even widening, the already wide inequalities in 
income. The pressures on national unity and on tolerance of con­
tinuing inequalities, of failure of significant benefit from whatever 
economic growth takes place, are thus li'.~ely to become great 
particularly because the spread of economic growth to the less 
developed regions is accompanied by the spread of modern views on 
the presumptive power of modern technology to bestow material ben­
efits on all humanity, and the demonstration effects of widespread 
high standards of consumption elsewhere. This means that, with 
respect to population, the developing societies must take account not 
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only of the over-all difficulty of raising aggregate income per 
capita when the total rate of population growth is so high, but also 
of the need to change the economic and social conditions of the large 
population groups at the lower rungs of the economic ladder to assure 
their interest in fewer children and smaller families. 
31. This suggests the fourth and most general comment on the 
problem under consideration, in the light of our earlier discussion 
of interrelations between population growth and modern economic 
growth in their -historical perspective. The adjustment that has to 
be made to the rapid decline in the death rates in the less developed 
countries is much greater and more pressing in many important 
respects than were the similar adjustments of the birth rates in 
the developed countries in the past. Not only is the current growth 
rate of population in the less developed regions so much higher than 
that of the older developed countries in their long-term past. Not only 
are the economic levels and reserves of the less developed regions 
so much lower than those of most currently developed countries in 
their pre-modern past. Not only may the tolerance of economic de­
privation and inequalities have been lowered with the spread of 
modern economic growth and modern views on the importance of equality 
of economic opportunity and on assurance of a minimum of material 
b2nefit for all groups. There is also a greater awereness of the 
connections bet1-1een demographic trends and the conditions of economic 
advance in the ap;e of modern technology and modern economic p;rowth; 
and cf the role that can be played by a more enlirhtencd policy than 
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the laissez-naire and pro-natalist policy which prevailed in the 
currently developed countries in the past. 
32. The above comment should not be interpreted to mean that 
no economic advance would be possible in the less developed regions 
of today, without striking reductions in birth rates. After all, 
despite the high growth rates of population, per capita product 
of the less developed economies grew over the 1950's and 1960's 
at a rate of about 1 1/2 percent per year (after all adjustments), which 
meant a rise over the two decades of about a third. 
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But while 
this record looks good in comparison with the past, it is far short 
of that shown by the developed economies over the period. More import­
ant, it raises questions as to whether such a gain can be maintained 
with continuation, and indeed the projected acceleration, in the 
rate of population gr0wth. Whatever the answer, the historical 
perspective suggests that a more deliberate population policy might 
consider not only the spread of knowledge of birth control technology, 
but also the ways in which the given institutional framework affects 
incentives on the part of a large proportion of people to shift 
toward greater investment in human capital and fewer children. This 
means exploring changes in economic, political, and social institutions 
that would enhance the interest of an increasing proportion of the 
population in the modern type of family -- given the attainment of 
death rates low enough to approximate modern levels. 
33. As indicated above, the comments on the current problem 
of high rates of population Rrowth in the less developed countries 
' 
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are illustrative. Moreintensive consideration was impossible, 
partly for lack of knowledge and partly for lack of space. In 
general, inferences from the past for the present and the future 
can only be suggestive. We could have illustrated the relevance 
of the historical perspective to the problems of demographic ad­
justment in the developed countries -- which are, however, quite 
different in range and emphasis from those stressed for the current 
problem for the less developed regions. It was not feasible to do 
so here. Yet I would like to conclude by stressing the differences 
in the specific implications of the population adjustment problems 
between the developed and less developed regions , which are marked 
as are those even among some subregions within each of the two 
groups. This means that the historical perspective would have to 
be translated into rather different implications for the two groups 
of countries, or for some subregions within each. Thus, although 
we are all inhabitants of one planet and members of world humanity, 
the population problems of the various regions are rather different. 
This has its favorable aspects, in that we are not all caught in 
the same bind that constrains many less developed countries, and 
resources can be transferred. But it also has its unfavorable 
aspects, in the sense that our interests and concern differ. But 
regardless of the implications for policy, in order to achieve better 
understanding, our interpretation 0f the historic~]. perspective must 
be geared to the different problems of the several societies and regions. 
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And the very analysis of what we can learn froin the past must be 
refined and tested, if it is to serve as a basis for more intel­
ligent treatment of current population problems. 
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